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KING V. BURWELL:  
THE SUPREME COURT’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CURE 
WHAT AILS CHEVRON 
Vanessa L. Johnson* 
Marisa Finley** 
J. James Rohack*** 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act PL 111-148 (ACA) and the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) represent “the most 
significant transformation of our health insurance market in more than 40 years . . . 
At the health law’s core is a ‘three‐legged stool’ approach to reforming these markets: 
new rules that prevent insurers from denying coverage or raising premiums based on 
preexisting conditions, requirements that everyone buy insurance, and subsidies to 
make that insurance affordable.”1  Considering health policy apart from its relation-
ship to tax policy is nearly impossible since “health policy cannot be separated from 
the fact that government finances, essentially through taxes, many of the services or 
programs health policy establishes.”2  In fact, the United States’ dependence on pri-
vate, employer-based health insurance is primarily a function of the tax exclusion for 
health care that began with “a 1942 ruling by the War Labor Board that allowed em-
ployers to bypass wartime wage controls by providing fringe benefits to workers.”3  
ACA not only maintains this system of tax-favored, employer-sponsored coverage, 
but with respect to tax administration, ACA is also arguably the most significant at-
tempt ever to reform social welfare policy through the tax code.4  The sheer number 
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 1.  Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing 
the Affordable 
 Care Act, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2010), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/up-
loads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf. 
 2.  BEAUFORT B. LONGEST, JR., HEALTH POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (Chicago: Health 
Administration Press, 5th Ed. 2014). 
 3.  Tom Miller, Kill the Tax Exclusion for Health Insurance, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 19, 2014, 
at 1, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/385704/kill-tax-exclusion-health-insurance-tom-mil-
ler. 
 4.  David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform, 65 TAX. 
L. REV. 669, 670 (2012). 
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of ACA tax provisions (33) is quite remarkable.5  Furthermore, these tax-related pro-
visions of the ACA are expected to “create a new framework that will dramatically 
alter the U.S. system for health care finance.”6   
Codified at Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, the ACA tax provision 
that has garnered the most attention is the one that subsidizes health insurance pre-
miums through a refundable premium assistance tax credit (PTC).7  It is one of two 
companion provisions of the 2010 health care reform legislation that provides subsi-
dies (that began in 2014) for low- and moderate-income individuals and families pur-
chasing health insurance through state health insurance exchanges.8  An integral com-
ponent of the ‘three‐legged stool’ approach and the primary subsidy utilized to make 
insurance affordable, premium assistance tax credits, at first glance, seem to be a 
pretty straightforward concept.9  However, both complex and controversial, these 
subsidies resulted in multiple legal challenges with inconsistent holdings based on 
the application of a decades-old doctrine, the Chevron framework.  The Chevron 
framework is a two-step process that allows for an unacceptable level of subjectivity 
by the Court.  An extra step needs to be added to the framework to create a more 
consistent application of the doctrine, which would also help minimize political in-
fluence at the judicial level. Consequently, on November 17, 2014, the Supreme 
Court of the United States (SCOTUS) granted certiorari to review King v. Burwell, 
759 F.3d. 358 (4th Cir. 2014), heard oral arguments on March 4, 2015, and issued its 
ruling in favor of the Obama Administration on June 25, 2015.   
For a second time, SCOTUS saved ACA. If the court had perpetuated the incon-
sistent applications of the Chevron framework and ruled along familiar ideological/
political lines in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants, the effects on healthcare reform 
would have been devastating.  The premium assistance tax credits are “important to 
the overall structure of the law, because many middle-income Americans can’t afford 
to pay the full price of insurance premiums.”10  In fact, in a report issued on June 18, 
2014, the Department of Health and Human Services reported the following:11 
Individuals who selected a Marketplace plan with a non-zero tax credit “have a 
post-tax credit premium that is 76 percent less than the full premium, on average, as 
a result of the tax credit—reducing their premium from $346 to $82 per month” (with 
 
 5.  IRS, AFFORDABLE CARE ACT TAX PROVISIONS (2015), https://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Af-
fordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions. 
 6.  David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform, 65 TAX. 
L. REV. 669, 670 (2012). 
 7.  Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms for Health Insurance 
Subsidies, 65 Tax L. Rev. 723 (2012). 
 8.  Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1401-1402, 124 Stat. 119, 
213-24 (2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001, 124 Stat. 
1029,1030-32 (2010) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 9.  Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing 
the Affordable Care Act, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2010), http://cdn.americanpro-
gress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf. 
 10.  Margot Sanger-Katz, What’s at Stake in Supreme Court’s Latest Health Care Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
7, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/upshot/whats-at-stake-in-supreme-courts-latest-
health-care-case.html. 
 11.  Amy Burke et al., Premium Affordability, Competition, and Choice in the Health Insurance Market-
place, 2014, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ASPE (June 18, 2014), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76896/2014MktPlacePremBrf.pdf. 
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an average subsidy of $264 per month)12 and 
69 percent of individuals selecting plans with tax credits “have premiums of $100 
or less after tax credits—nearly half (46 percent) have premiums of $50 or less after 
tax credits.”13  
Consequently, a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants would have disal-
lowed subsidies for about six million people in 34 states with federally operated in-
surance exchanges and likely resulted in the lapse of many of these health insurance 
policies.14  In fact, before the ruling, the Minority Staff of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce released a report entitled, District-by-District Impact of a Potential 
Supreme Court Ruling against Affordable Care Act Federal Exchange Tax Credits, 
which stated:  
“The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that if the Supreme Court rules against 
the Administration, over 13 million Americans could lose tax credits to help pay for 
insurance coverage by 2016. These tax credits will be worth an average of over 
$4,800 annually . . . a total of approximately $65 billion in tax credits are at risk.”15   
Furthermore, a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants, would have also ren-
dered the employer mandate unenforceable in federally facilitated exchange states 
since “employers that fail to provide minimum essential coverage or fail to provide 
affordable and adequate coverage are only subject to a tax penalty if one or more of 
their employees receive premium tax credits for the purchase of a qualified health 
plan through an exchange.”16  The individual mandate would have also been weak-
ened, “as many individuals who may owe a tax under the individual mandate are 
individuals for whom coverage would be unaffordable—and who would thus be ex-
empt from the mandate—were it not for the assistance they will receive for purchas-
ing insurance through premium tax credits.”17  As a consequence, premiums in the 
individual market would have likely risen “sharply in federally facilitated exchange 
states in the event of a plaintiffs’ ultimate victory.”18  For example, as the King v. 
Burwell opinion notes, studies predicted that premiums, both inside and outside of 
the Exchanges, would increase by 35 to 47 percent and enrollment would decrease 
by 69 to 70 percent.19  To summarize, although the ACA’s market reform provisions 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.; Drew Altman, Facing the Political Fallout From a King v. Burwell Ruling, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG 
(June 19, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/19/facing-the-fallout-from-a-king-v-burwell-ruling. 
 15.  Minority Staff, District-by-District Impact of a Potential Supreme Court Ruling Against Affordable 
Care Act Federal Exchange Tax Credits, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COM-
MERCE (December 2014), https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141223160731/http://democrats.ener-
gycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Fact-Sheet-District-By-District-King-vs-Burwell-Im-
pacts-2014-December.pdf. 
 16.  Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Appellate Decisions Split on Tax Credits in ACA Federal 
Exchange, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 23, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/23/implementing-
health-reform-appellate-decisions-split-on-tax-credits-in-aca-federal-exchange/. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015), citing E. Saltzman & C. Eibner, The Effect of Elimi-
nating the Affordable Care Act’s Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces (215) and L. Blumberg, M. 
Buettgens, & J. Holahan, The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in King vs. Burwell: 
8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums (2015). 
4 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:1 
would have remained in place, a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants and the 
resulting combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement 
would have likely pushed some States’ individual insurance markets into a death spi-
ral.20   
These potential negative effects clearly demonstrate that the legal question pre-
sented in King v. Burwell held economic and political significance.  Consequently, 
instead of applying the Chevron framework, as all the lower courts had done in the 
related legal challenges, SCOTUS found that using this doctrine (which defers to the 
administrative agency’s judgment when Congressional intent is not clear) was not 
proper.21  The court explained that the ACA does not expressly delegate the authority 
to interpret the statute to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).22  Thus, SCOTUS found 
that determining the correct reading of Section 36B was its responsibility and rea-
soned that “it is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision 
to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy.”23  Unfortu-
nately, however, the problem with this approach is that SCOTUS squandered an op-
portunity to address the flaws in Chevron that were clearly demonstrated by the in-
consistent application of the doctrine in the related cases in the lower courts.  
Therefore, the goals of this article are to outline the construct of the ACA’s premium 
assistance tax credits, to explore the legal controversies surrounding these subsidies, 
to use the tax subsidies cases to demonstrate the flaws in the Chevron framework, 
and to argue that the Supreme Court should have framed its King v. Burwell analysis 
in a way that would have cured, rather than ignored, the ails of Chevron. 
I.  PREMIUM ASSISTANCE TAX CREDITS AND ADVANCED PREMIUM TAX CREDITS 
Starting in 2014, PPACA and HCERA add to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
a refundable ‘premium assistance [tax] credit’24 to defray an “applicable tax-
payer[‘s]” outlays for individual market health care coverage purchased through a 
state-run insurance exchange.”25  Premium assistance tax credits are provided to peo-
ple with projected household income between 100 percent (133 percent in states that 
have chosen to expand their Medicaid programs as that expansion will cover those 
up to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) including childless adults) and 
 
 20.  Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three Legged Stool”: The Costs of Partially Repealing 
the Affordable Care Act, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 2 (Aug. 2010), http://cdn.americanpro-
gress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf; King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 
(2015). 
 21.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015). 
 22.  Id. at 2489. 
 23.  Id. at 2483. 
 24.  Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent, 
Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 5, 5-38 (2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633556 (summarizing the many tax provisions of the ACA); 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 
2011). 
 25.  Edward A. Zelinsky, The Health-Related Tax Provisions of PPACA and HCERA: Contingent, 
Complex, Incremental and Lacking Cost Controls, N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 5, 26 (2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633556 (summarizing the many tax provisions of the ACA). 
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400 percent of FPL and who are not covered by Medicaid and/or eligible for “afford-
able”26 employer-sponsored health insurance, which provides “minimum value.”27  
The primary “target population for the PTC is those with household incomes of more 
than 133 percent but not more than 400 percent of the poverty line.”28 Within the 
range of credit-eligible household incomes, the credit decreases as household income 
increases so that the after-credit cost of basic health insurance (“the applicable second 
lowest cost silver plan with respect to the taxpayer”29) will not exceed a specified 
percentage of the taxpayer’s household income, “with the specified percentage in-
creasing as the household income (expressed as a percentage of the poverty line) 
increases”.30  “For taxpayers with household incomes of up to 133% of the poverty 
line, the credit will reduce the after-credit health insurance premium to 2% of house-
hold income . . . [and] At the other end of credit-eligible household income, for a 
taxpayer with income of 300% to 400% of the poverty line, the after-credit premium 
will be 9.5% of household income.”31 Because families that spend more than 10 per-
cent of their income on health care are considered to have high medical cost burdens, 
the goal was to keep premiums below this 10 percent threshold.32  The amount of the 
credit is determined on a monthly basis using the following four step process:33 
1. The taxpayer identifies the “adjusted monthly premium”34 for the “applicable 
second lowest cost silver plan. . . of the individual market in the rating area 
in which the taxpayer resides.”35 The applicable silver plan may be a self-
only coverage plan for a single insured individual36 or a family plan.37  
2. Multiply the taxpayer’s annual household income by an “applicable percent-
age” and divide the resulting product by twelve.38  The applicable percentage 
is based on the following table:39  
 
 
 26.  Employer-provided coverage is deemed affordable if the employee’s required contribution for the an-
nual premium is less than or equal to 9.5 percent of the employee’s household income. 26 U.S.C.A. § 
36B(c)(2)(C)(i)-(iv) (West 2011). The 9.5 percent figure will be indexed to reflect the extent to which health 
insurance premiums grow faster than do income and consumer prices. 
 27.  An employer-provided health plan provides “minimum value” if “the plan’s share of the total allowed 
costs of benefits provided under the plan is (at least) 60 percent of such costs.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii) 
(West 2011); Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms for Health Insur-
ance 
Subsidies, 65 Tax L. Rev. 723, 724 (2012). 
 28.  Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing Between Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms for Health Insurance 
Subsidies, 65 Tax L. Rev. 723, 724 (2012). 
 29.  I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2015). 
 30.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 724-25,; I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A) (West 2015). 
 31.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 724-25. 
 32.  Peter J. Cunningham, The Share of People with High Medical Costs Increased Prior to Implementa-
tion of the Affordable Care Act, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 117, 118 (2015). 
 33.  Zelinsky, supra note 24, at 27-28. 
 34.  I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2015). 
 35.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1)(B) (West 2015). 
 36.  I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (West 2015). 
 37.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
 38.  Id. § 36B(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 39.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). 
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Household Income 
(expressed as percent 
of poverty line) 
The initial premium 
per-centage is 
The final premium per-
centage is 
Up to 133% 2.00% 2.00% 
133% up to 150% 3.00% 4.00% 
150% up to 200% 4.00% 6.30% 
200% up to 250% 6.30% 8.05% 
250% up to 300% 8.05% 9.50% 
300% up to 400% 9.50% 9.50% 
 
For taxable years beginning in any calendar year after 2014, these “applica-
ble percentages” will be indexed depending upon the extent to which health 
insurance premiums grow faster than income and consumer prices.40 
3. Subtract from the “adjusted monthly premium”( determined in the first step) 
the amount calculated in the second step.41  
4. If the resulting difference is negative or zero, the taxpayer is not entitled to 
the premium assistance tax credit, but if the resulting difference is positive, 
the amount is then compared to the monthly premium the taxpayer actually 
pays through the exchange.42 “The lesser of these figures is the amount of 
the premium assistance tax credit to which the taxpayer is entitled for the 
month,”43 and “the sum of these monthly amounts constitutes the refundable 
tax credit the taxpayer may take for the year.”44 
An eligible taxpayer is entitled to the credit only with respect to the months for 
which he (or a family member) is covered by a qualified health plan, but he may 
choose to have all or a portion of the PTC paid in advance to the issuer of the health 
plan to reduce the monthly premiums.45 This is referred to as the ‘Advance Premium 
Tax Credit’ (APTC).46  Individuals that take advantage of the APTCs must complete 
IRS Form 8962 to reconcile the APTC paid and the PTC for which they were eligible 
on their annual tax return.47  If the advance credit amount was less than the amount 
of the credit to which the taxpayer is actually entitled, the taxpayer receives the re-
maining credit amount as tax refund.48  However, “if the advance payment amount 
was greater than the amount of credit to which the taxpayer is actually entitled, the 
general rule is that the taxpayer must repay the entire amount of the excess.”49  Rec-
ognizing that repayment could potentially impose a hardship for some taxpayers, 
 
 40.  Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I). 
 41.  Id. § 36B(b)(2)(B). 
 42.  Id. § 36B(b)(2)(A). 
 43.  Zelinsky, supra note 24, at 27-8; see I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2) (West 2015). 
 44.  Zelinsky, supra note 24, at 27-8; see I.R.C.. § 36B(b)(1) (West 2015). 
 45.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727; I.R.C § 36B(b) (West 2015).. 
 46.  Amy Burke, Arpit Misra & Steven Shiengold,  Premium Affordability, Competition, and Choice in the 
Health Ins. Marketplace, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (June 18, 2014), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/HEALTH/REPORTS/2014/PREMIUMS/2014MKTPLACEPREMBRF.PDF. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727; see I.R.C. § 36B(f)(1) (West 2015). 
 49.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727; see I.R.C. § 36B(f)(2)(A) (West 2015). 
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Congress initially instituted a cap on the amount to be repaid in the case of taxpayers 
whose actual income for the credit year was less than 400% of the poverty line ($400 
in the case of family insurance coverage and $250 in the case of individual cover-
age).50  However, to offset the cost of other provisions contained in the amending 
legislation, Congress has twice adjusted the cap to require greater reconciliation.51  
Late in 2010, it replaced the $400 cap with a variable cap, ranging from $600 in the 
case of taxpayers with household income of less than 200% of the poverty line to 
$3500 in the case of taxpayers with household income of at least 450% but less than 
500% of the poverty line.  In April 2011, Congress changed the caps to $600 for a 
taxpayer with household income of less than 200% of the poverty line, $1500 for a 
taxpayer with household income of at least 200% but less than 300% of the poverty 
line, $2500 for a taxpayer with household income of at least 300% but less than 400% 
of the poverty line, and no cap for a taxpayer with household income at or above 
400% of the poverty line.52 Therefore, “practical eligibility for and the amount of the 
PTC are functions of both income for the official year of the credit and income for 
one or both of the two preceding years. The relevance of income of both the current 
year and an earlier year (or years) is explicit in the case of a taxpayer relieved of the 
burden of full reconciliation by the cap of §36B(f).53   
However, “[i]n the case of a taxpayer not entitled to advance payment of the 
credit (based on income prior to the official credit year), §36B purports to base the 
amount of the credit solely on the taxpayer’s income for the official credit year.”54  
The premium tax credit program regulations are detailed and some of the issues 
addressed are extremely complicated and very technical.  Hence, this article will not 
include a detailed discussion of all the regulations associated with the premium as-
sistance tax credits.  However, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) website provides 
a great timeline of the release of the applicable regulations by the Department of 
Treasury (Treasury) and IRS.55   
II. THE LEGAL CONTROVERSIES 
On November 7, 2014, The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) re-
leased the order granting review of King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 
2014), which was one of several Administrative Procedure Act challenges to the pre-
mium assistance tax credit program.  The other cases included Halbig v. Burwell from 
the District of Columbia Circuit, Pruitt v. Burwell from the Tenth Circuit, and State 
of Indiana v. IRS from the Southern District of Indiana.  All the plaintiffs contended 
 
 50.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727; see also I.R.C. § 36B (West 2015). 
 51.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727. 
 52.  Id.; see Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-309, § 208(a), 124 Stat. 3285, 
3291-92 (2010); Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Prot. and Repayment of Exch. Subsidy Overpayments Act of 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, § 4, 125 Stat. 36, 36-37 (2011). 
 53.  Zelenak, supra note 7, at 727-8. 
 54.  Id. at 728. 
 55.  Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Affordable-
Care-Act-Tax-Provisions. 
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that the Internal Revenue Service’s broad interpretation of §36B to authorize the sub-
sidy for insurance purchased on Exchanges established by the Federal government 
(IRS Rule) was contrary to the language of the statute, which, they asserted, author-
ized tax credits only for  individuals who purchase insurance on state-run Ex-
changes.56 Despite virtually identical claims, the rationale and rulings of the various 
courts differed, yet, many were surprised that the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
As a general rule, in the absence of an active circuit split, there is no conflict to re-
solve to ensure the uniformity of federal law.57  Both Indiana v. IRS and Pruitt v. 
Burwell are United States District Court cases.  In Indiana v. IRS cross motions for 
summary judgment were filed, while Pruitt v. Burwell was appealed to the Tenth 
Circuit after The Eastern District Court in Oklahoma vacated the IRS rule.  However, 
further proceedings were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. 
Burwell.  The Halbig v. Burwell decision, which vacated the IRS rule, was a panel 
decision, but an en banc rehearing of the case was scheduled on December 17, 2014.  
Further proceedings were also stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in King 
v. Burwell. Nevertheless, per Supreme Court Rule 10, King v. Burwell, “unquestion-
ably concerns an ‘important question of federal law,’ as the resolution of this case 
could have a significant impact on the implementation of the PPACA, particularly in 
the 36 states that have not established their own exchanges.”58 Furthermore, “an ad-
ditional reason to take the case now is that the litigation creates substantial uncer-
tainty about the operation of the law, and should the plaintiffs’ claims been upheld, 
policymakers, insurance companies, and those who would otherwise be eligible for 
subsidies will need time to figure out how to respond.”59   
 As previously mentioned, the rationale and rulings of the various courts differed 
despite the fact the plaintiffs’ claims are virtually identical in all the cases. Addition-
ally, all the courts applied the framework from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) to analyze the legal merits of 
each case, as outlined below.   
Complaint: Indiana v. IRS 
The State of Indiana and several Indiana school corporations and districts filed a 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Judicial Estoppel. The suit is an 
Administrative Procedure Act challenge to the IRS regulation implementing the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).60  The complaint states, “The 
United States has expanded the class of beneficiaries entitled to federal insurance 
subsidies by redefining the term ‘exchange’ in Section 1401(a) of the ACA to include 
 
 56.  King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 398 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); State of Ind. v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:13-CV-1612 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Pruitt v. Burwell, No. 14-
7080 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 57.  Jonathan H. Adler, Will the Supreme Court grant certiorari in King v. Burwell?, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, November 3, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2014/11/03/will-the-supreme-court-grant-certiorari-in-king-v-burwell/. 
 58.  Jonathan H. Adler, Why Did the Court Grant Cert in King v. Burwell?, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/07/why-did-the-court-grant-
cert-in-king-v-burwell/. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Complaint at 2, Indiana v. IRS, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-1612). 
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both state-run insurance exchanges and federally-run exchanges”61 and that “this re-
definition causes injuries to States and their political subdivisions as sovereign poli-
cymakers and employers.”62  The complaint claims that because the Tenth Amend-
ment precludes Congress from being able to require States to set up their own 
Exchanges, “instead it created a system designed to convince states to do so volun-
tarily.”63 Furthermore, the complaint elaborates that “in addition to providing funds 
for start-up costs, Congress wrote into the ACA subsidies for citizens who purchased 
health insurance on state-established Exchanges, but provided no similar benefits for 
citizens who purchase insurance using federally-established Exchanges”64 and ex-
plains the congressional rationale, stating that “the availability of exclusive federal 
subsidies to customers of state exchanges would prompt citizens to pressure state 
officials to establish (and ultimately absorb the expense of operating) Insurance Ex-
changes.”65  Given Indiana’s decision not to establish a State Exchange, the com-
plaint argues that “the result should be that, commencing in 2014, Indiana citizens 
purchasing coverage from a Federal Exchange would not receive subsidies for doing 
so, with the consequence that Indiana employers (including the State and its political 
subdivisions) who do not afford minimum essential coverage to all employees work-
ing 30 hours or more per week would not have to pay Employer Mandate penalties.”66  
Consequently, the IRS rule “stating that citizens who purchase coverage on a Federal 
Exchange are entitled to the same subsidies as citizens who purchase from a State 
Exchange (“IRS Rule”)”67 “contravenes the text of the ACA, thwarts Indiana’s abil-
ity to execute State policy,”68 and “violates both the Administrative Procedure Act 
and the Tenth Amendment.”69 
Pruitt v. Burwell (formerly Pruitt v. Sebelius)70 Complaint 
Interestingly, the original complaint that the ACA was an unconstitutional exer-
cise of Congress’s Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers was 
filed back in 2011 before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S._ (2012) (“NFIB”).  Proceedings were stayed while 
the SCOTUS decision was pending, but after NFIB resolved the commerce clause 
and necessary proper clause issues, the State of Oklahoma and Scott Pruitt, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General, amended the complaint to raise new claims.  
The amended complaint asked for “declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to 
 
 61.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 70.  The named defendant in these complaints against the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
is the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  When the complaint was originally filed, Kathleen Sebelius 
held this office.  After the resignation of Secretary Sebelius, Sylvia Mathews Burwell was nominated, con-
firmed, and then sworn into the role on June 9, 2014. 
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final federal regulations (the “Final Rule”) that were issued under Internal Revenue 
Code Section 36B,”71 stating that “the Final Rule was issued in contravention of the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (“the 
APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702; has no basis in any law of the United States; and directly 
conflicts with the unambiguous language of the very provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code it purports to interpret.”72  The complaint further explains that the ACA 
leaves the policy judgment of whether or not to establish an Exchange to the States, 
but “the Final Rule upsets this balance by providing, contrary to the Act, that quali-
fying taxpayers are eligible for premium tax credits and ‘advance payments’ if they 
enroll for health insurance through the Exchange where they live, regardless of 
whether it is a State-established Exchange or an HHS-established Exchange.”73 Con-
sequently, the complaint argues that “if the Final Rule is permitted to stand, federal 
subsidies will be paid under circumstances not authorized by the Congress; employ-
ers will be subjected to liabilities and obligations under circumstances not authorized 
by Congress; and States will be deprived of the opportunity created by the Act to 
choose for itself whether creating a competitive environment to promote economic 
and job growth is better for its people than access to federal subsidies.”74 
Pruitt v. Burwell: U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 
Court Opinion 
In response to the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment, on Sep-
tember 30, 2014, U.S. District Judge Ronald A. White, a George W. Bush appointee, 
issued an order, which held “that the IRS Rule is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law, pursuant to 5 U.S .C. §706(2)(A), 
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(C), or otherwise is an invalid implementation of the 
ACA, and is hereby vacated.”75  The court prefaced its explanation of the Chevron 
analysis with the statement that the court found the rationale of Halbig v. Burwell 
more persuasive than that of King v. Burwell.76  Next, it outlined the steps of the 
Chevron framework that it used, stating  
Chevron entails two steps. If the court determines “at the first stage of the 
inquiry that ‘Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’ 
the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress.’” See Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC v. Jones, 760 F.3d 1147, 1155 
(10th Cir. 2014)(citation omitted).
 
If, however, “‘the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue,’” the court ‘“will uphold the 
agency’s interpretation if it is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.’” “The first question, whether there is such an ambiguity, is for the 
 
 71.  Amended Complaint at 3, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, (E.D. Okla. 2014) (No. CIV-11-030-
RAW). 
 72.  Id. ¶ 3-4. 
 73.  Id. ¶ 4-5. 
 74.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 75.  Oklahoma ex rel, Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d. 1080, 1093 (E.D. Okla. 2014). 
 76.  Id. at 1087. 
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court, and we owe the agency no deference on the existence of ambiguity.” 
Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005).77 
The court goes on to explain that similar to the majority in Halbig, it “resolved 
the issue at the first stage of Chevron, finding that inasmuch as ‘the ACA unambig-
uously restricts the section 36B subsidy to insurance purchased on Exchanges ‘estab-
lished by the State.’’”78 In the remainder of the order, the court also compares and 
contrasts the Halbig and King opinions to demonstrate its alignment with the ra-
tionale of Halbig.79 Furthermore, the court even implies that it believes that the Chev-
ron framework is not the appropriate legal standard by citing the Yazoo requirement 
(see quote below), which both the Halbig and King opinions brushed aside, instead 
identifying as controlling, the holding of Mayo Foundation for Medical Educ. and 
Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) that found that Chevron applies with 
full force in the tax context. 
At the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court asks “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” In re FCC 11-161, 
753 F.3d 1015, 1040 (10th
 
Cir. 2014)(citation omitted). On this particular 
“precise question,” however, case law does not provide “wiggle room” for 
finding ambiguity. This is because tax credits must be expressed in “clear 
and unambiguous language.” Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Thomas, 
132 U.S. 174, 186 (1889).
 
See also Shami v. C.I.R., 741 F.3d 560, 567 (5th 
Cir. 2014)(Tax credits are a matter of legislative grace, are only allowed 
as clearly provided for by statute, and are narrowly construed).80 
The order concludes by acknowledging, but not quite echoing, the Halbig ma-
jority’s stated reluctance in vacating the IRS rule.81  Instead, the court downplays the 
stakes of the ruling, characterizes the statement regarding “Appellants’ not-so-veiled 
attempt to gut the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘ACA’)”82 in Judge 
Edwards’ dissent in Halbig as apocalyptic, emphasizes that the case is simply one of 
statutory interpretation and that “the court is upholding the Act as written” with the 
assumption that “Congress says what it means,” and restates its holding vacating the 
IRS Rule.83  
As previously mentioned, the government timely filed an appeal to the Tenth 
Circuit, and further proceedings were stayed until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
King v. Burwell.   
 
 77.  Id. at 1088. 
 78.  Id. at 1089. 
 79.  Id. at 1087. 
 80.  Id. at 1090-91. 
 81.  Id. at 1091. 
 82.  Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1091 (E.D. Okla. 2014) (citing Halbig v. 
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 83.  Id. at 1092-93. 
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Halbig v. Burwell (formerly Halbig v. Sebelius)84 Complaint 
The parties in this case are numerous and include individuals and entities from 
several different states, including Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Kansas.  The individual plaintiffs (Halbig, Klemencic, Lowery, and Rumpf) are com-
plaining that absent the IRS Rule, based on realistic estimates of their expected in-
comes, they would not be required to purchase health insurance because they would 
fall within the unaffordability exemption to the individual mandate penalty in 2014.85  
However, because the IRS Rule makes them eligible for premium assistance, they 
will be disqualified from that exemption and subject to the individual mandate pen-
alty.86 As a result, they will be forced to either pay a penalty or purchase more insur-
ance than they would prefer to buy.87  The plaintiffs that are legal entities are com-
plaining that absent the IRS Rule, they would not be threatened by the employer 
mandate, because their employees would not be eligible for federal subsidies and, 
therefore, their businesses would not be subject to assessable payments under the 
employer mandate.88   
 
Furthermore, the complaint explains: 
to encourage states to establish Exchanges, Congress used carrots, such as 
startup grants to help fund the creation of Exchanges . . . The biggest carrot 
was the offer of premium-assistance subsidies from the Federal Treasury 
refundable tax credits to help a state’s low- and moderate-income residents 
buy insurance—if that state set up its own Exchange.89  
However, according to the complaint:  
States rejecting the offer got a stick instead: the imposition of a federally-
established, federally operated Exchange in the state, with no subsidies at 
all . . . That choice has left the federal government with the burden of es-
tablishing Exchanges in those states, but without the burden of paying for 
premium-assistance subsidies to the residents of those states—just the bal-
ance that Congress struck.90   
Finally, the complaint asserts: 
Notwithstanding express statutory language limiting premium-assistance 
 
 84.  The named defendant in these complaints against the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
is the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  When the complaint was originally filed, Kathleen Sebelius 
held this office.  After the resignation of Secretary Sebelius, Sylvia Mathews Burwell was nominated, con-
firmed, and then sworn into the role on June 9, 2014. 
 85.   Amended Complaint at 4-5, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, (E.D. Okla. 2014) (No. CIV-11-030-
RAW). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. ¶ 16-18. 
 89.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 90.  Id. ¶ 2-3. 
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subsidies to Exchanges established by states, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) has promulgated a regulation (“the IRS Rule” or “the Subsidy Ex-
pansion Rule”) purporting to authorize subsidies even in states with only 
federally-established Exchanges, thereby disbursing monies from the Fed-
eral Treasury in excess of the authority granted by the Act. The IRS Rule 
squarely contravenes the express text of the ACA, ignoring the clear limi-
tations that Congress imposed on the availability of the federal subsidies. 
And the IRS promulgated the regulation without any reasoned effort to 
reconcile it with the contrary provisions of the statute.91  
The complaint closes by requesting the following relief – a declaratory judgment 
that the IRS Rule violates the APA, a preliminary and permanent injunction prohib-
iting the application or enforcement of the IRS Rule, and all other relief deemed just 
and proper.92 
Halbig v. Burwell: U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Opinion 
On January 15, 2014, United States District Judge Paul L. Friedman, a Clinton 
appointee, issued an opinion in response to the parties’ cross-motions for summary 
judgment granting the defendants’ motion, denying the plaintiffs’ motion, and enter-
ing a judgment for the defendants.93  The court first outlines the Chevron framework 
it used: 
“Under step one of Chevron, [the court] ask[s] whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety 
& Health Admin. v. Nat’l Cement Co. of California, Inc., 494 F.3d 1066, 
1073 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). In 
determining whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue, the Court uses the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” 
including an examination of the statute’s text, the structure of the statute, 
and (as appropriate) legislative history. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 
131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Meredith v. 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1053 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).  
If, however, the Court concludes that “the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue . . . , [the Court] move[s] to the second 
step and defer[s] to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is ‘based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.’” In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 
 
 91.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 92.  Id. at V. 
 93.  Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety & 
Health Admin. v. Nat’l Cement Co. of California, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1074). 
At Chevron step two, the court must uphold the agency’s interpretation “if 
it is reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose and legislative 
history.” Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d at 1049. “Unlike [the court’s] 
Chevron step one analysis, [its] review at this stage is ‘highly deferential.’” 
Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Assn. of Amer. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 137 
(D.C. Cir. 2000)).  
Plaintiffs also object to the IRS Rule as being arbitrary and capricious. An 
agency rule is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.” Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, —- F.3d ——, 2013 WL 6819158, 
at *11 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). As the D.C. Circuit recently 
noted, “[t]he analysis of disputed agency action under Chevron Step Two 
and arbitrary and capricious review is often ‘the same, because under 
Chevron step two, [the court asks] whether an agency interpretation is ar-
bitrary or capricious in substance.’” Id. at *11 (quoting Judulang v. 
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011)).94 
In his analysis, Judge Friedman starts out reviewing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a), the stat-
utory provision that authorizes the premium tax credits, and he immediately high-
lights the fact that it “does not distinguish between taxpayers residing in states with 
state-run Exchanges and those in states with federally-facilitated Exchanges.”95  
Next, he emphasizes that “the tax credit to a qualifying individual is tied to the cost 
of insurance purchased ‘through an Exchange established by the State under [42 
U.S.C. § 18031],’”96 but “the term ‘Exchange’ is not defined in Section 36B.”97  
However, he explains, “the phrase ‘established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 
18031]’ directs the Treasury Secretary and the IRS Commissioner to define ‘Ex-
change’ with reference to other provisions of the ACA, located in Title 42 of the 
United States Code. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i).”98  Accord-
ingly, Judge Friedman summarily rejects the plaintiffs’ contention, that  
by using the phrase “established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031],” 
as opposed to a phrase like “established under this Act,” see 42 U.S.C. § 
18032(d)(3)(D)(i)(II), Congress intended to refer exclusively to state-run 
 
 94.  Id. at 16-17. 
 95.  Id. at 18. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
JOHNSON-1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2016  11:47 AM 
2016] Journal of Legislation 15 
Exchanges, as opposed to federally-facilitated Exchanges, and thus to limit 
the availability of the Section 36B tax credits to persons residing only in 
the states that have established their own Exchanges.99 
Instead, Judge Friedman argues that “under plaintiffs’ construction of the Act, a 
taxpayer in a state with a federal Exchange will never purchase insurance ‘enrolled 
in through an Exchange established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]’”100 be-
cause “the premium assistance credit amount available to ‘applicable taxpayers’ re-
siding in states with federally-facilitated Exchanges” would always be zero.101  The 
court then acknowledges that “the plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c), viewed 
in isolation, appears to support plaintiffs’ interpretation,”102 but stresses that in mak-
ing the threshold determination under Chevron, however, the meaning – or ambiguity 
– of certain words or phrases must be placed in context explaining that “one cannot 
look at just a few isolated words in 26 U.S.C. § 36B, but also must at least look at the 
other statutory provisions to which it refers. (citing United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 
1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting construction that isolated disputed statutory 
provision from expressly cross-referenced statute).”103  Next, the opinion highlights 
the inconsistency in the plaintiffs’ argument, which supports a very literal interpreta-
tion of the language despite the fact that both “plaintiffs and defendants agree that 42 
U.S.C. § 18031 does not mean what it literally says; states are not actually required 
to “establish” their own Exchanges. Pls.’ SJ Opp. 14 (‘All agree that states are free 
not to establish Exchanges.’)”104 because “if a state will not or cannot establish its 
own Exchange, the ACA directs the Secretary of HHS to step in and create ‘such 
Exchange’ – that is, by definition under the statute, ‘an American Health Benefit 
Exchange established under [Section 18031].’ 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c); 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-91(d)(21).”105  To summarize, Judge Friedman explains “even where a state 
does not actually establish an Exchange, the federal government can create ‘an Ex-
change established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]’ on behalf of that state.”106 
 Although he finds the defendants’ arguments “more credible when viewed in 
light of the cross-referenced provisions,”107 because each side provides a plausible 
construction of the language of section 36B(b)-(c), Judge Friedman considers other 
“tools of statutory construction under Chevron step one, including the structure of 
the statute and the context in which the language of Section 36B is set.”108 In doing 
so, he focuses on two provisions in the ACA: the reporting requirements for state and 
federal Exchanges (Section 36B(f)), and the eligibility requirements for individuals 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 18-19. 
 104.  Id. at 19. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 20. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 29 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). 
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purchasing insurance through the Exchanges (42 U.S.C. § 18032)109 and “finds the 
defendants’ arguments compelling and the plaintiffs’ counterarguments unpersua-
sive.”110  Explaining that - 
if construed literally, these provisions would be nullified when applied to 
states without state-run Exchanges, leading to strange or absurd results. 
These provisions make far more sense when construed consistently with 
defendants’ interpretation of the Act – i.e., viewing 42 U.S.C. § 18041 as 
authorizing the federal government to create “an Exchange established by 
the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]” on behalf of a state that declines to 
establish its own Exchange.111 
Next, Judge Friedman rebutted the plaintiffs’ premise that tax credits are availa-
ble only on the state-run Exchanges with the argument that it “runs counter to this 
central purpose of the ACA: to provide affordable health care to virtually all Ameri-
cans. Such an interpretation would violate the basic rule of statutory construction that 
a court must interpret a statute in light of its history and purpose.”112 Additionally, 
he refutes the plaintiffs’ explanation for the inconsistency – that “Congress desper-
ately wanted to keep the federal government out of the business of running any Ex-
change, and it therefore sought to persuade the states to establish and operate the 
Exchanges”113 by offering the tax credits as an inducement to those states that set up 
their own Exchanges – by showing that “there is simply no evidence in the statute 
itself or in the legislative history of any intent by Congress to ensure that states es-
tablished their own Exchanges.”114  In fact, the judge argues that the legislative his-
tory confirms Congress’s intent with evidence that “early proposals for comprehen-
sive health insurance reform contemplated that the federal government would 
establish and operate the Exchanges, and an earlier version of the House Bill so pro-
vided,”115 and that “the Senate Finance Committee expressly contemplated that the 
federal government could “establish state exchanges.”116 
To summarize, Judge Friedman held that “the plain text of the statute, the statu-
tory structure, and the statutory purpose make clear that Congress intended to make 
premium tax credits available on both state-run and federally-facilitated Ex-
changes”117 and, therefore, concluded “that ‘Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question’ of whether an ‘Exchange’ under 26 U.S.C. § 36B includes federally-
facilitated Exchanges.”118 As a consequence, he settled the matter at step one of 
 
 109.  Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d, at 21 (2014). 
 110.  Id.at 20. 
 111.  Id. at 22. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 23. 
 115.  Id. at 36; See Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872 §§ 141(a), 201(a) (2010) (version reported in the 
House on March 17, 2010) (establishing a national exchange within a newly created Health Choices Admin-
istration located in the Executive Branch); see also H. REP. NO. 111-443, at 18, 26 (2013). 
 116.  Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (2014); See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 19 (Oct. 19, 2009). 
 117.  Halbig, supra note 93, at 25. 
 118.  Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 842). 
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Chevron, stating it “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress”119 and that the IRS appropriately promulgated “regulations authorizing the 
provision of tax credits to individuals who purchase health insurance on federally-
facilitated Exchanges as well as to those who purchase insurance on state-run Ex-
changes.”120 
Halbig v. Burwell: U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit – Panel Opinion 
The plaintiffs timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
and a three judge panel consisting of Thomas B. Griffith, a George W. Bush appoin-
tee, Harry T. Edwards, a Jimmy Carter appointee, and A. Raymond Randolph, a 
George H.W. Bush appointee heard oral arguments on March 25, 2014.  Judge Grif-
fith filed the panel’s opinion on July 22, 2014, with Judge Randolph concurring and 
Judge Edwards strongly dissenting.  The panel concluded “that the ACA unambigu-
ously restricts the section 36B subsidy to insurance purchased on Exchanges ‘estab-
lished by the State,’”121 reversed the District Court, and vacated the IRS’s regula-
tion.122  The panel defined its Chevron framework as follows: 
On the merits, this case requires us to determine whether the ACA permits 
the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased through federal Ex-
changes. To make this determination, we begin by asking “whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” for if it has, we 
must give effect to its unambiguously expressed intent. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The text 
of section 36B is only the starting point of this analysis. That provision is 
but one piece of a vast, complex statutory scheme, and we must consider 
it both on its own and in relation to the ACA’s interconnected provisions 
and overall structure so as to interpret the Act, if possible, “as a symmet-
rical and coherent scheme.” See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wolf 
Run Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 659 F.3d 
1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2011).123 
The panel then declared that the “appellants have the better of the argument: a 
federal Exchange is not an ‘Exchange established by the State,’ and section 36B does 
not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Ex-
changes.”124 The panel reached the conclusion by first examining “section 36B in 
light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and fed-
eral Exchanges.”125 The judges found that “nothing in section 1321 deems federally-
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 399. 
 125.  Id. 
18 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 42:1 
established Exchanges to be ‘Exchange[s] established by the State,’”126 explaining 
that the “omission is particularly significant since Congress knew how to provide that 
a non-state entity should be treated as if it were a state when it sets up an Ex-
change”127 since “in a nearby section, the ACA provides that a U.S. territory that 
‘elects . . . to establish an Exchange . . . shall be treated as a State.’ 42 U.S.C. § 
18043(a)(1).”128 Therefore, the panel reasoned that “the absence of similar language 
in section 1321 suggests that even though the federal government may establish an 
Exchange ‘within the State,’ it does not in fact stand in the state’s shoes when doing 
so.”129  
Next, the judges considered the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ con-
struction generates absurd results when the plain meaning of section 36B is not 
adopted since the “obligation to avoid adopting statutory constructions with absurd 
results is well-established.”130 Under this principle, a court “will not give effect to a 
statute’s literal meaning when doing so would ‘render [the] statute nonsensical or 
superfluous or . . . create[] an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that 
Congress could not have intended it.’”131  However, this absurdity doctrine has a very 
narrow domain, and a high threshold is necessary before a court can conclude that a 
statute does not mean what it says.132  “A provision thus ‘may seem odd’ without 
being ‘absurd,’ and in such instances ‘it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix 
it,’ even if it ‘may have been an unintentional drafting gap.’”133 Using this standard, 
it is unsurprising that the panel rejected the government’s argument that vacating the 
IRS rule would render the reporting requirements in section 36B(f) superfluous.134  
The court argues that “even if credits are unavailable on federal Exchanges, reporting 
by those Exchanges still serves the purpose of enforcing the individual mandate—a 
point the IRS, in fact, acknowledged in promulgating a recent regulation, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.6055-1(d)(1);”135 therefore, “the government’s claim that section 36B(f)(3)’s re-
porting requirement serves no purpose other than reconciling credits is therefore 
simply not true.”136The panel further elaborates that “requirements would still allow 
the reconciling of credits on state Exchanges; as applied to federal Exchanges, they 
would simply be over-inclusive. “Over-inclusiveness, however, remains a problem 
even if we were to agree that section 36B allows credits on federal Exchanges . . . 
[and] [a] weakness common to both views of the availability of credits hardly serves 
as a basis for choosing between them.”137  Similarly, the panel rebuts the defendant’s 
 
 126.  Id. at 400. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. (quoting 42 USC §18043). 
 129.  Id.; See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (where Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute and 
different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally. (citing Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). 
 130.  Id.at 402; see Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1989). 
 131.  Id. (quoting a statutes literal meaning in United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 891 (D.C. Cir 2010)). 
 132.  See generally id. 
 133.  Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005); see also Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C.Cir.2002). 
 134.  See id. at 403. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 404 
 137.  Id. at 404. 
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argument regarding the “absurd consequences appellants’ interpretation of section 
36B would have for section 1312 of the ACA, which defines the rights of ‘qualified 
individuals.’”138  If given its plain meaning, “the 36 states with federal Exchanges 
(that, obviously, the states did not establish) have no qualified individuals.”139  “That 
outcome is absurd, the government argues, because, in its view, section 1312 restricts 
access to Exchanges to qualified individuals alone.”140  “The absence of qualified 
individuals would mean that federal Exchanges have no customers and therefore no 
purpose.”141  The government urges the panel “to avoid this outcome by interpreting 
section 1321 to authorize the federal government to establish Exchanges ‘on behalf 
of” states that decline to do so.”142  The panel declines, explaining: 
Section 1312(a)’s actual language simply establishes the right of a quali-
fied individual to enroll in any qualified health plan, at any level of cover-
age.  On this reading, giving the phrase “established by the State” its plain 
meaning creates no difficulty, let alone absurdity. Federal Exchanges 
might not have qualified individuals, but they would still have custom-
ers—namely, individuals who are not “qualified individuals.” Several 
other provisions in section 1312 imply that not only “qualified individuals” 
may participate in an Exchange. . . participation in an Exchange does not 
depend on “qualified individual” status.  That proposition gains further 
strength from section 1312(d)(3), which states, first, that “[n]othing in this 
title shall be construed to restrict the choice of a qualified individual to 
enroll or not to enroll in a qualified health plan or to participate in an Ex-
change,” 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(A), and, second, that “[n]othing in this 
title shall be construed to compel an individual to enroll in a qualified 
health plan or to participate in an Exchange,” id. § 18032(d)(3)(B).143 
To conclude, the panel finds “that the government has failed to make the extraor-
dinary showing required for such judicial rewriting of an act of Congress.  Nothing 
about the imperative to read section 36B in harmony with the rest of the ACA requires 
interpreting ‘established by the State’ to mean anything other than what it plainly 
says.”144 
Finally, the panel considered the ACA’s purpose and its legislative history and 
found that the government again came “up short in its efforts to overcome the statu-
tory text.”145  The panel’s “inquiry into the ACA’s legislative history [was] quite 
narrow.”146 The judges asked “only whether the legislative history provides evidence 
that this literal meaning is ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions’ of the ACA’s 
 
 138.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2010)). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2015)). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 405. 
 144.  Id. at 406. 
 145.  Id. at 399. 
 146.  Id. at 407. 
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drafters,”147 explaining that “[T]here must be evidence that Congress meant some-
thing other than what it literally said before a court can depart from plain mean-
ing.”148  Additionally, during this inquiry, the court offered the example of the pro-
posed bill by The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
(HELP) “that specifically contemplated penalizing states that refused to participate 
in establishing ‘American Health Benefit Gateways,’ the equivalent of Exchanges, 
by denying credits to such states’ residents for four years”149 to refute the govern-
ment’s argument and demonstrate “that members of Congress at least considered the 
notion of using subsidies as an incentive to gain states’ cooperation.”150  The panel’s 
majority also was not persuaded by both the government’s and the dissent’s “more 
abstract form of legislative history—Congress’s broad purpose in passing the ACA—
urging the court to view section 36B through the lens of the ACA’s economic theory 
and ultimate aims” to achieve near universal coverage and lower insurance premi-
ums.151  The majority instead asserted that “the ACA’s ultimate aims shed little light 
on the ‘precise question at issue,’ namely, whether subsidies are available on federal 
Exchanges because such Exchanges are ‘established by the State’.”152  Additionally, 
the majority argued that “the legislative record provides little indication one way or 
the other of congressional intent, but . . . Section 36B plainly makes subsidies avail-
able only on Exchanges established by states.  And in the absence of any contrary 
indications, that text is conclusive evidence of Congress’s intent.”153  As a result of 
the conclusion that the IRS Rule is not a permissible reading of the ACA, the court 
‘reluctantly’ reversed the District Court and remanded with instructions to grant sum-
mary judgment to appellants and vacate the IRS Rule.154 
 The defendants timely filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc, and the order was 
granted on September 14, 2014.  Oral arguments were scheduled for December 17, 
2014.  However, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in King v. Burwell, the 
appellants filed a motion requesting that the court hold its en banc proceedings in 
abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision.   
King v. Burwell (formerly King v. Sebelius)155 Complaint 
The parties in this Administrative Procedure Act challenge—David King, Doug-
las Hurst, Brenda Levy, and Rose Luck—are all individuals of the age of 55 or older 
and residents of Virginia.156  With projected household incomes of $48,000 or less 
in 2014 and no eligibility for employer or government sponsored health coverage  
 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 408. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 411 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc.,  467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 153.  Id. at 421. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  The named defendant in these complaints against the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
is the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  When the complaint was originally filed, Kathleen Sebelius 
held this office.  After the resignation of Secretary Sebelius, Sylvia Mathews Burwell was nominated, con-
firmed, and then sworn into the role on June 9, 2014. 
 156.  Complaint at 3-4, King v. Sebelius, 997 F.Supp 2d 415 (E.D.Va. 2014) (No. 13-CV630). 
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that  satisfies  the  individual  mandate, absent the IRS Rule, they would all be  entitled  
to  a  certificate  of  exemption  from  the  individual  mandate  penalty  for  2014 
because  the  cheapest  bronze  plan  on  the  federal  Exchange  in  Virginia would  
cost  more  than  8% of their projected  household  incomes.157  Therefore, they will 
either be  forced  to  pay  a penalty  or  purchase  more  insurance  than  they would 
prefer.158  Consequently, the plaintiffs complain that the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) regulation (“the IRS Rule”) purporting to authorize subsidies, even in 
states with only federally established Exchanges, disburses monies from the Federal 
Treasury in excess of the  authority granted by the Act.159  They argue that “[t]he 
IRS Rule squarely contravenes the express text of the ACA, ignoring the clear limi-
tations that Congress imposed on the availability of the federal subsidies.  And 
the IRS promulgated the regulation without any reasoned effort to reconcile it with 
the contrary provisions of the statute.”160  As a consequence, the subsidies financially 
injure and restrict their economic choices.161   
For these people, the IRS Rule, by reducing to some extent the out-of-
pocket cost of health coverage, effectively subjects them to the individual 
mandate’s requirement to purchase costly, comprehensive health insur-
ance that they otherwise would forgo; further, it prevents them from pur-
chasing cheaper, high-deductible catastrophic coverage that under the 
ACA may only be sold to individuals who are under age 30 or who have a 
certificate of exemption from the individual mandate penalty.162   
Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the IRS Rule is 
illegal under the Administrative Procedure Act, and injunctive relief barring its en-
forcement.163 
 
 
King v. Burwell: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Virginia Richmond 
Division Opinion 
In response to a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs and a Motion 
to Dismiss filed by Defendants, on February 18, 2014, District Judge James R. Spen-
cer, a Ronald Reagan appointee, issued a memorandum opinion, which granted the 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and denied as moot all remaining motions.164  To 
begin analysis of the statutory interpretation, Judge Spencer outlines the Chevron 
framework as follows:  
 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 1. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 2. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  King v. Sebelius, 997 F.Supp 2d 415, 432 (E.D.Va. 2014). 
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“Chevron deference is a tool of statutory construction whereby courts are 
instructed to defer to the reasonable interpretations of expert agencies 
charged by Congress to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, in the 
statutes they administer.”  Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
654 F.3d 496,504 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am.  Online, Inc. v. AT&T 
Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). Chevron deference requires a court to undertake a 
two-part analysis to review an agency’s regulation.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  At the first step, a 
court must look to the “plain meaning” of the statute and determine if the 
regulation responds to it. Id. at 837, 842-43. If it does, the inquiry need not 
continue.  Id.  At the second step, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, a 
court must determine whether a given regulation is a permissible construc-
tion.  Id. at 843; Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 654 F.3d at 504.  
l. Chevron Step One 
Under Chevron, if a statute is unambiguous regarding the question pre-
sented, the statute’s plain meaning controls.  Morgan v. Sebelius, 694 F.3d 
535,537 (4th Cir. 2012).  In order to be ambiguous, disputed language must 
be ‘reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.’ Nat’l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka &Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 
(1985).  At the first step of Chevron, a court may also employ traditional 
tools of statutory construction to ascertain whether Congress has expressed 
its intent regarding the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 
n.9; Nat’l Elec. Mfi’s. Ass’n, 654 F.3d at 504.165 
After discussing the meaning of “Exchange” as used in Section 36B, Judge Spen-
cer explains, “[a]t first blush, each party presents seemingly credible constructions of 
the language in section 36B. Viewed in a vacuum, it seems comprehensible that the 
omission of any mention of federally-facilitated Exchanges under section 
36B(b)(2)(A) could imply that Congress intended to preclude individuals in feder-
ally-facilitated Exchanges from receiving tax subsidies.  However, when statutory 
context is taken into account, Plaintiffs’ position is revealed as implausible.”166  He 
elaborates that “[c]ourts have a duty to construe statutes as a whole”167 and that 
“Plaintiffs’ reading of section 36B grows even weaker when other sections of the 
ACA are taken into account.”168  Next, the opinion addresses “the more anomalous 
results of Plaintiffs’ reading of section 36B at length.”169  The defendants argued that 
“part of the definition of the term ‘qualified individual’ requires that the individual 
 
 165.  Id. at 426-27. 
 166.  Id. at 427-28. 
 167.  King v. Sebelius, 997 F.Supp 2d at 428; see, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010). 
 168.  King v. Sebelius, 997 F.Supp 2d at 428. 
 169.  Id. 
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reside in a State that establishes an Exchange under Section 1311 (“Residency Re-
quirement”).”170  Therefore, “under Plaintiffs’ reading of section 36B, no person in 
a state with a federally-facilitated Exchange could become a ‘qualified individ-
ual.’”171  Judge Spencer finds the defendants argument more persuasive, stating that 
“plaintiffs’ insistence that the Court should read the Residency Requirement out of 
the ACA or not apply Section 1312 to federally-facilitated Exchanges is a telltale 
sign that their reading of section 36B is wrong?  If construed literally, the eligibility 
provision would be nullified when applied to states with federally-facilitated Ex-
changes, rendering the provision superfluous.”172  The second anomalous provision 
the opinion discusses involves the reporting requirements under Section 36B(f)(3).173  
“Defendants assert that under Plaintiffs’ reading, federally-facilitated Exchanges 
would perform an ‘empty act’ because they would have to report the aggregate 
amount of any advance payment of subsidies as zero, and would not have to report 
any individualized information necessary to determine eligibility for subsidies.”174  
Plaintiffs counter, “without support, that this provision is an example of sensible 
draftsmanship because otherwise Congress would have had to draft separate sections 
detailing reporting requirements.”175  However, Judge Spencer concludes that the 
Plaintiffs’ interpretation would make section 36B(f) “superfluous with respect to fed-
erally-facilitated Exchanges under Section 1321 because such Exchanges would not 
be authorized to deliver tax credits.”176  Instead, he argues “Section 36B(f) thus in-
dicates that Congress assumed that premium tax credits would be available on any 
Exchange, regardless of whether it is operated by a state under [Section 1311] or by 
HHS under [Section 1321].”177 
 Next, since “it is firmly established that legislative history is one of the tradi-
tional tools of interpretation to be consulted at Chevron’s step one,”178 Judge Spencer 
considers the “various legislative history materials including, but not limited to, past 
versions of the ACA, committee reports, reports by the Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) and Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”), and finally, even news media” 
presented by the parties.179  However, his review ultimate ends with the conclusion 
that “what is clear is that there is no direct support in the legislative history of the 
ACA for Plaintiffs’ theory that Congress intended to condition federal funds on state 
participation.”180  Instead, “[t]he legislative history of the ACA ‘reveals an intent to 
grant states the option of establishing their own Exchanges, rather than an intent to 
 
 170.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § i8032(f)(i)(A)(ii)). 
 171.  Id. at 429. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. (quoting Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp.3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
 178.  Id. at 430 (citing Morgan v. Sebelius, 694 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 431 (citing Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp.3d at 16 (holding that there is no evidence in the 
legislative record that the House, the Senate, any relevant committee of either House, or any legislator ever 
entertained the idea of conditioning federal tax credits upon state participation in the creation of the Ex-
changes)). 
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coerce or entice states into participating.’ Further, the text of the ACA and its legis-
lative history evidence congressional intent to ensure broad access to affordable 
health coverage for all.”181 
 Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the text of section 36B is am-
biguous, Judge Spencer finds that “Plaintiffs’ arguments fail at Chevron step two.  
Chevron deference is afforded only when an ‘agency’s interpretation is rendered in 
the exercise of [its] authority [to make rules carrying the force of law]’ . . .  [and] 
HHS and IRS should receive Chevron deference in their interpretation of section 36B 
and the ACA because the ACA is a ‘shared-administration’ statute and both HHS and 
the Department of the Treasury are in full agreement about how to interpret the word 
‘Exchanges’ within the context of section 36B.”182  To summarize, Judge Spencer 
concluded that even if the “Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ACA, section 36B, and 
related HHS regulations is reasonable, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show 
that Defendants’ contrary reading is unreasonable;”183 therefore, “in light of the ap-
plicable legislative history of the ACA and the above discussion of the anomalous 
consequences of Plaintiffs’ reading of the ACA, Defendants at the very least have 
presented a reasonable interpretation of HHS’s regulations and, thus, section 36B.”184 
King v. Burwell: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit – Panel Opinion 
The Plaintiffs timely appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and  
on July 22, 2014, Judge Roger L. Gregory, a William Clinton appointee; Steph-
anie D. Thacker, a Barack Obama appointee; and Andre M. Davis, a Barack Obama 
appointee, issued an opinion.  The court upheld the IRS rule “as a permissible exer-
cise of the agency’s discretion, affirming the judgment of the district court.”185  When 
evaluating the merits of the case, because it concerns a challenge to an agency’s con-
struction of a statute, the court applied the familiar two-step analytic framework set 
forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).186  The court outlined the framework as follows: 
At Chevron’s first step, a court looks to the “plain meaning” of the statute 
to determine if the regulation responds to it.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
If it does, that is the end of the inquiry and the regulation stands.  Id.  How-
ever, if the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the court then 
moves to Chevron’s second step and defers to the agency’s interpretation 
so long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.  Id. at 
843.  
A. 
At step one, “[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous ‘that is the end of 
 
 181.  Id. (citing Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp.3d at 17) 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  King v. Burwell, 749 F.3d at 363. 
 186.  Id. at 367. 
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the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).  A statute is ambiguous only if the 
disputed language is “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.” 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 
U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985).  “The objective of Chevron step one is not to 
interpret and apply the statute to resolve a claim, but to determine whether 
Congress’s intent in enacting it was so clear as to foreclose any other in-
terpretation.”  Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1367, 
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Courts should employ all the traditional tools of 
statutory construction in determining whether Congress has clearly ex-
pressed its intent regarding the issue in question.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 
n.9; Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 504 
(4th Cir. 2011).187 
After evaluating the parties’ arguments and the plain language of the statute, the 
court admits, “there can be no question that there is a certain sense to the plaintiffs’ 
position.  If Congress did in fact intend to make the tax credits available to consumers 
on both state and federal Exchanges, it would have been easy to write in broader 
language, as it did in other places in the statute.”188  However, the court further ex-
plains that “when conducting statutory analysis, ‘a reviewing court should not con-
fine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, [t]he 
meaning – or ambiguity – of certain words or phrases may only become evident when 
placed in context.”189  Therefore, with that in mind, the court concluded that “the 
defendants’ primary counterargument points to ACA §§ 1311 and 1321, which, when 
read in tandem with 26 U.S.C. § 36B, provide an equally plausible understanding of 
the statute, and one that comports with the IRS’s interpretation that credits are avail-
able nationwide.”190  Finally, the court adds that “[g]iven that Congress defined ‘Ex-
change’ as an Exchange established by the state, it makes sense to read § 1321(c)’s 
directive that HHS establish ‘such Exchange’ to mean that the federal government 
acts on behalf of the state when it establishes its own Exchange.”191  However, the 
court chose not to “ignore the common-sense appeal of the plaintiffs’ argument”192 
since “a literal reading of the statute undoubtedly accords more closely with their 
position.  As such, based solely on the language and context of the most relevant 
statutory provisions,”193 the court decided “that Congress’s intent is so clear and un-
ambiguous that it ‘foreclose[s] any other interpretation.’”194   
 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 368 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(3)(D)(i)(II) (referencing Exchanges “established under this 
Act”)). 
 189.  Id. at (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007). 
 190.  Id. at 368-69. 
 191.  Id. at 369. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. (quoting Grapevine Imps. Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
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The judges then examined the provisions of the Act—the reporting provisions in 
Section 36B(f) and the ‘qualified individuals’ provision under ACA § 1312—which 
the defendants argue would be superfluous if the court accepted the plaintiffs’ inter-
pretation of the statute, “to see if they shed any more light on Congress’s intent.”195  
After reviewing the interpretations of both provisions by both parties, the court states, 
“while we think the defendants make the better of the two cases, we are not convinced 
that either of the purported statutory conflicts render Congress’s intent clear. Both 
parties offer reasonable arguments and counterarguments that make discerning Con-
gress’s intent difficult.”196  Additionally, the court noted “that the Supreme Court has 
recently reiterated the admonition that courts avoid revising ambiguously drafted leg-
islation out of an effort to avoid ‘apparent anomal[ies]’ within a statute.”197  As a 
result, the court declined “to accept the defendants’ arguments as dispositive of Con-
gress’s intent.”198 
 Next, “noting that, ‘in consulting legislative history at step one of Chevron, we 
have utilized such history only for limited purposes, and only after exhausting more 
reliable tools of construction,’”199 the court ultimately concludes “nothing in the leg-
islative history of the Act provides compelling support for either side’s position.”200  
Consequently, “having examined the plain language and context of the most relevant 
statutory sections, the context and structure of related provisions, and the legislative 
history of the Act,”201 the judges decided that they were “unable to say definitively 
that Congress limited the premium tax credits to individuals living in states with state-
run Exchanges”202 and that “the statute is ambiguous and subject to at least two dif-
ferent interpretations.”203  As a result, the court was “unable to resolve the case in 
either party’s favor at the first step of the Chevron analysis.”204 
 Moving to Chevron’s second step, the court asked “whether the ‘agency’s [ac-
tion] is based on a permissible construction of the statute’”205 and found that “this is 
a suitable case in which to apply the principles of deference called for by Chev-
ron.”206  The court further explained that it was “primarily persuaded by the IRS 
Rule’s advancement of the broad policy goals of the Act”207 since it is “clear that 
widely available tax credits are essential to fulfilling the Act’s primary goals and that 
Congress was aware of their importance when drafting the bill.”208  Therefore, to 
summarize, the court concluded “[i]t is thus entirely sensible that the IRS would enact 
 
 195.  Id. at 369 (citing Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–
33 (2000) (‘A court must . . . interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if 
possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.’). 
 196.  Id. at 371. 
 197.  Id. (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014)). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 505 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 200.  Id. at 372. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
 206.  Id. at 373 (citing See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014)). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 374. 
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the regulations it did, making Chevron deference appropriate. Confronted with the 
Act’s ambiguity, the IRS crafted a rule ensuring the credits’ broad availability and 
furthering the goals of the law. In the face of this permissible construction, we must 
defer to the IRS Rule”209 and accordingly affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.210 
 Both the King v. Burwell and Halbig v. Burwell opinions were published on July 
12, 2014 with polar opposite conclusions.  While the defendants in Halbig timely 
filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc, the plaintiffs in King instead filed a Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari.  As previously mentioned, despite the absence of a circuit 
split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 7, 2014. Oral arguments 
were held on March 4, 2015, and the opinion was issued on June 25, 2015. 
III.  INCONSISTENT HOLDINGS PRODUCED BY CHEVRON 
 Interestingly, as previously mentioned, despite virtually identical claims and the 
application of the Chevron framework by all the courts, the rationale and rulings have 
differed substantially.  The following chart demonstrates the anomalous rulings ren-
dered before the Supreme Court’s ruling in King v. Burwell: 
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Throughout the discussion of the legal controversy in Section II, the different 
iterations of the Chevron framework that each court used was identified.  Although 
similar, considering that Chevron is a well-established framework, and in fact, “the 
most famous rule of administrative law”211 with more than 7000 case and 5000 law 
review references,212 the enormity of the variations is somewhat surprising.  How-
ever, from a legal perspective, the differing rulings seem completely unacceptable.  
The same framework applied to similar or identical facts should yield the same result, 
yet the rulings in Halbig v. Burwell are a perfect example of the inconsistencies in 
application.  In the District Court, Judge Friedman settled the matter at step one, 
holding that “the plain text of the statute, the statutory structure, and the statutory 
purpose make clear that Congress intended to make premium tax credits available on 
both state-run and federally-facilitated Exchanges.”213  Furthermore, he concluded 
“that ‘Congress has directly spoken to the precise question’ of whether an ‘Exchange’ 
under 26 U.S.C. § 36B includes federally-facilitated Exchanges.”214  The Circuit 
Court’s panel also settled the matter at step one but concluded “that the ACA unam-
biguously restricts the section 36B subsidy to insurance purchased on Exchanges ‘es-
tablished by the State.’”215  The District Court and DC Circuit Court came to polar 
opposite conclusions when examining the exact same facts and claims.  The only 
differences are the political affiliations of the jurists.  United States District Judge 
Paul L. Friedman is a Democratic appointee, while two of the three-member panel in 
the DC Circuit Court were Republican appointees.216 In fact, it is notable that in the 
lower courts, the only Republican appointed jurist that held in favor of the Admin-
istration was U.S. District Judge James R. Spencer.217  The first African-American 
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to serve as a federal judge in Virginia, Judge Spencer was appointed by President 
Ronald Reagan and was already scheduled to step down from active status to become 
a senior judge on March 25, 2014 when he issued the memorandum opinion in King 
v. Sebelius.218   
To conclude, these cases were clearly brought for a political purpose—to bring 
down the ACA.219 The political underpinnings of a case should not dictate its out-
come.  The major problems with the Chevron framework are not only its political 
manipulability, but also the inconsistent application of the doctrine that is permissive 
under the current construct.  
IV. WHAT AILS CHEVRON 
When cases reach the Supreme Court, “it’s always a mystery how much the jus-
tices consider extralegal factors in politically charged cases, including the ruling’s 
implications for the court’s legacy, public opinion and political repercussions; or the 
consequences for ordinary people.”220  However, Professor Jack M. Beermann’s ex-
amination of the voting records of individual Justices in cases citing Chevron reveals 
that the Court generally splits “along familiar ideological lines, with liberals deferring 
to liberal agency interpretations and conservatives deferring to conservative agency 
interpretations”221 and doesn’t “seem to turn on a diversity of views concerning 
Chevron deference and related doctrines.”222  Based on the data Professor Beermann 
gathered, agencies seemed to be winning at the Supreme Court more often since 
2010.223  They prevailed in 9.5 of the thirteen cases decided and “slightly fewer than 
half of the decisions are unanimous (six of thirteen).”224  Following is a table with 
the aggregate voting totals for each Justice still on the Court and since the beginning 
of Justice Roberts’ tenure and before the most current term:225 
 
Supreme Court Voting Splits in Cases Citing Chevron 
Supreme Court Justice With Agency Against Agency 
Chief Justice Roberts 19.5 10.5 
Justice Scalia 16.5 13.5 
Justice Kennedy 19.5 10.5 
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Supreme Court Voting Splits in Cases Citing Chevron 
Justice Thomas 17.0 12.0 
Justice Alito 18.0 10.0 
Justice Ginsburg 18.0 12.0 
Justice Breyer 18.0 10.0 
Justice Sotomayor 10.0 3.0 
Justice Kagan 9.0 2.0 
 
“Critics blame Chevron’s manipulability, but arguably the blame lies more with 
the legal indeterminacy of all of the other statutory interpretation rules upon which 
Chevron relies.”226  Chevron “and the other canons of interpretation are inextricably 
linked through Chevron’s own formulation”227 because Chevron’s famous two-step 
provides: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  [n.9]  If, however, the court 
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at is-
sue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, 
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.228  
“As to the ascertainment of ambiguity, . . .  Chevron tells courts to defer to rea-
sonable agency statutory interpretations if the statute is ambiguous, but it also tells 
courts that they first should attempt to resolve any ambiguities themselves using the 
traditional tools of statutory construction.”229 However, the problem “is that the 
Court never sets out what those―traditional tools are, likely because it could not 
agree on them if it wanted to.  The result is that Chevron has become a punching bag 
for those who argue that courts are result-oriented in their approach to agency defer-
ence,”230 and these uncertainties about the relationships among the non-Chevron can-
ons cause inconsistencies in the Chevron cases themselves.231  For example, “the 
Court is divided about whether legislative history should be used to eliminate statu-
tory ambiguity (and so preclude agency deference under Chevron);”232 so, “the fed-
eral courts are generally inconsistent in their use of such canons at Step One.”233  
Consequently, “understanding the statutory interpretation landscape makes clear that 
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the disputes are not really about Chevron. Rather, they reflect a lack of consensus on 
the court about the other interpretive tools.”234  There tools are “murky at best, be-
cause the Court cannot agree on what the traditional tools of construction are, or in 
what order they should be applied, and because the Court will not treat any decision 
on such matters as carrying any kind of stare decisis effect.”235  To summarize, “the 
lack of methodological consensus in the federal courts when it comes to the rest of 
the interpretive principles,”236 not the Chevron framework itself, is the primary rea-
son for the inconsistencies demonstrated by the rulings in the ACA tax subsidy cases. 
 V. KING V. BURWELL, A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR A CHEVRON CURE 
 As previously discussed, instead of applying the Chevron framework, SCOTUS 
found that using this doctrine, which defers to the administrative agency’s judgment 
when Congressional intent is not clear, was not proper because the legal question 
presented in King v. Burwell was one of “deep ‘economic and political significance’” 
that should not be delegated to the IRS absent the express intent of Congress.237  This 
rationale is persuasive since, as the court correctly stated, “the tax credits are among 
the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affect-
ing the price of health insurance for millions of people.”238  However, it is also evi-
dent that the Supreme Court wanted to settle this important matter without deferring 
to the IRS, likely not only for the reasons that it stated in the opinion, but also because 
when President Obama completes his second term, the newly elected administration 
could have completely reversed the current interpretation of the IRS if the court had 
used Chevron and found that the intent of Congress was not clear.  The Supreme 
Court should have framed its King v. Burwell analysis in a way that would have ad-
dressed the ails of Chevron rather than simply choosing not to apply the framework. 
 As discussed in sections III and IV, politics definitely played a role in the lower 
courts’ application of Chevron, and research shows that the Supreme Court also gen-
erally splits along familiar ideological lines.239  Furthermore, extralegal factors also 
play a role in politically charged cases, and the absence of such partisanship would 
likely have allowed Congress simply to change the language in ACA to make its 
intent clear.240  However, even attempting to address the inherently political nature 
of cases, such as King v. Burwell, is virtually impossible without fundamentally 
changing the nature of our democracy.  Instead, SCOTUS should clearly define 
which tools of statutory construction should be used, the order in which they should 
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be applied, and give this clarification the effect of stare decisis.  Following is a dis-
cussion of how SCOTUS could have revised and applied the Chevron framework in 
King v. Burwell.  
 The Supreme Court essentially states in King v. Burwell that Chevron does not 
apply because the case is too important to defer to the judgment of the IRS; therefore, 
it is the court’s responsibility to determine the meaning of the statute.  The framework 
should apply to any case of statutory interpretation by an agency. Specifically, SCO-
TUS should use the modified version of the framework described below.  In King v. 
Burwell, the IRS clearly interpreted the statute, and its interpretation is the central 
legal issue in not only King, but also all the related cases previously discussed.  Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court should have applied Chevron, just as the lower courts 
did, and the revised, first step in the court’s analysis should have been to determine 
whether or not the legal controversy was about an agency’s interpretation of a statute. 
 Next, the first question posed after determining that the Chevron framework 
applies is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” or 
in other words, whether “the intent of Congress is clear.”241  In this step, SCOTUS 
applies tools of statutory construction to conclude whether or not Congressional in-
tent is clear. In King v. Burwell, despite its refusal to apply the Chevron framework, 
the Supreme Court performs this analysis primarily by utilizing the legislative history 
and ‘the Whole Act Rule’, which encompasses context and consideration of the pur-
poses of the legislation.242  Furthermore, the majority specifically declines to apply 
both the plain meaning rule and the rule to avoid surplusage.243  The plain meaning 
rule assumes “that the words of a statute mean what an ‘ordinary’ or ‘reasonable’ 
person would understand them to mean,” and the rule to avoid surplusage, “is based 
on the principle that each word or phrase in the statute is meaningful and useful, and 
thus, an interpretation that would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless 
should be rejected.”244  The court’s analysis and application of these rules and tools 
yielded the conclusion that “the phrase ‘an Exchange established by the State under 
[42 U.S.C. § 18031]’ is properly viewed as ambiguous.”245 
Due to the court’s conclusion that the phrase is ambiguous or, in other words, 
that “the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question 
at issue,” if the court had applied the Chevron framework, it would have been unable 
to “simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation.”246  Instead, the question for the court 
would have been “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.”247  Yet, as previously discussed, to avoid deferring to the IRS, 
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SCOTUS declined to apply the doctrine, arguing that the legal question presented in 
King v. Burwell was one of such “deep ‘economic and political significance’” that it 
should not be delegated to the IRS absent the express intent of Congress.248  The 
Supreme Court should have applied Chevron, just as the lower courts did, since this 
legal controversy is about an agency’s interpretation of a statute.  Instead of com-
pletely bypassing the Chevron framework, SCOTUS should have added an interme-
diate question to the framework, after completing the step one analysis.  After finding 
that the statute is ambiguous, the court should have posed the question, “Does the 
statute expressly delegate sole authority to the agency to interpret the statute?”  In 
King v. Burwell, asking this question as an intermediate step would have achieved 
the result that SCOTUS aimed to achieve – eliminating the deference to the agency.  
In this revised version of Chevron, if the statute does not expressly delegate sole 
authority to the administrative agency that issued the regulation being challenged, the 
court should then step in to determine the meaning of the statute by using the legis-
lative history, context, and purposes of the legislation as its guide.  However, if the 
statute does expressly delegate authority to the agency, it is appropriate for court to 
move the question of “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.”249   
The revised Chevron framework would be:  
Is the legal controversy about an agency’s interpretation of a statute? 
If yes, apply the Chevron framework (go to #2). 
If no, apply another appropriate framework/analysis. 
Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue, or, in other words, 
is the intent of Congress clear? 
The court should utilize the following tools, in the precise order defined below 
(as used by SCOTUS in the King v. Burwell opinion), to answer the question: 
Context and Structure– require the reader to use contextual and structural clues 
to interpret the meaning or scope of a particular word or phrase.250 
Legislative History – the court should consult the “legislative history to see what 
a statute’s history might suggest about the meaning of a word or phrase.”251 
Purpose – the court should use purpose clauses to help discern the intent of the 
legislature and/or when choosing between multiple interpretations, “refer to the stat-
ute’s purpose in deciding which interpretation is superior.”252 
Using the aforementioned tools, if the court decides that “the intent of Congress 
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”253 
“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the pre-
cise question at issue,” the court should move to the question posed in #3. 
In the statute, does Congress expressly delegate sole authority to interpret the 
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statute to the agency that has issued the challenged interpretation?254 
If no, the court may impose its own construction on the statute. 
If yes, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”255 
This revised framework would have allowed SCOTUS to use the same rationale 
that it proffered in its King v. Burwell opinion and reach the same conclusion—”that 
Section 36B allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created un-
der the Act.”  Furthermore, it would have provided more clarity on how courts should 
determine the answer to the question regarding whether or not Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.  Designating the precise tools of statutory 
construction to utilize and defining the order in which to use them should reduce the 
framework’s results-oriented manipulability.  For example, an investigation of the 
Halbig v. Burwell decisions proves that this method may have resulted in more con-
sistent holdings despite the differing political ideologies of the judges.  Although both 
opinions consider all three tools - context, legislative history, and the purpose of the 
statute – similar to Scalia’s dissent in King v. Burwell, the Circuit Court relied heavily 
on the “plain meaning rule,” thereby, essentially eschewing other contextual clues.  
Considering that most contemporary statutes span hundreds of pages Applying the 
context rule, rather than the plain meaning rule, especially if the court is also com-
pelled to consider both the legislative history and purposes of the statute, is a more 
reasonable method to determine Congressional intent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Not only should the Supreme Court have followed its established precedent of 
analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute by applying the Chevron framework, 
but it also should have used its King v. Burwell analysis to revise the framework to 
fix the flaws that have allowed courts to manipulate the doctrine.  Similar to King v. 
Burwell, litigation in health policy cases with significant economic and political con-
sequences will inevitably involve challenges to administrative agencies’ interpreta-
tion of legislation.  Thus, the framework used to determine these cases should be a 
structured, well-reasoned one that produces consistent, legally supported holdings, 
rather than results-oriented, political outcomes.  The revised framework recom-
mended in this article should help to accomplish this important goal.  
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